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The Civic Virtues of Skepticism, Intellectual Humility, and Intellectual 
Criticism 
Allan Hazlett 
Forthcoming in J. Baehr (ed.), Intellectual Virtues in Education: Essays in 
Applied Virtue Epistemology (Routledge).   
For the Ancient Pyrrhonians, “skepticism” was a name for something 
thoroughly practical – it was a name for a way of life, consisting of the 
maintenance of suspension of judgment, which was meant to lead to 
tranquility.  For contemporary epistemologists, however, “skepticism” is a 
name for something thoroughly theoretical – it is a name for a hypothetical 
view, which no one actually holds, on which no one knows anything.  For the 
Pyrrhonians, skepticism was a path that you might choose to follow; for 
contemporary epistemologists, skepticism is at best a paradox, and at worst 
absurd.1  Between these two extremes lies an Early Modern understanding of 
“skepticism” as a name for something both practical and theoretical.  The 
skeptic, on this understanding, is a valuable member of liberal democratic 
society in virtue of (among other things) her disposition to attribute ignorance, 
both to herself and to other people.  Here I’ll articulate and defend the idea 
that skepticism, so understood, is a civic virtue, drawing on David Hume’s 
discussion of mitigated skepticism in the closing section of his Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding (1748), and I’ll articulate a proposal for 
how to educate for skepticism, based on Benjamin Franklin’s discussion of 
intellectual humility in his Autobiography (1790). 
1 Skepticism as a character trait 
In the final section of the Enquiry, Hume distinguishes between three species 
of skepticism.  The first is: 
a species of skepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, 
which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a 
sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgment[, 
which] recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our 
former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties. 
(§XII, p. 149)2 
At least “when more moderate” (p. 150), Hume approves of this kind of 
skepticism, but suggests that the universal doubt described is not possible for 
actual human beings.  Note well that skepticism, on this understanding, is 
something like a stance or attitude – “an universal doubt” about all opinions, 
principles, and faculties.     
The second species of skepticism Hume considers is a: 
species of skepticism, consequent to science and enquiry, 
when men are supposed to have discovered, either the 
                                                   1	  An	  exception	  here	  is	  Pierre	  Le	  Morvan’s	  (2011)	  instructive	  discussion	  of	  “healthy	  skepticism.”	  	  	  
2 Page references to the Enquiry are from Hume 1975.  
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absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their 
unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious 
subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly 
employed. (p. 150) 
After a lengthy discussion of the arguments for this kind of skepticism (pp. 
151-8), Hume reminds us one of the central ideas of his Enquiry: 
[T]he great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive 
principles of scepticism is action, and employment.  These 
principles may flourish and triumph in the schools … [b]ut as 
soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real 
objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in 
opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they 
vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined skeptic in 
the same condition as other mortals. (p. 159) 
Moreover, Hume argues, “no durable good can ever result from … excessive 
scepticism” (ibid.); such skepticism would not be “beneficial to society.” (p. 
160) So the Cartesian species of skepticism, though useful, is merely 
hypothetical, and the Pyrrhonian species is both useless and impossible to 
sustain.   
There is a third species of skepticism, however, which Hume calls “a more 
mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy.” (p. 161) This, he argues, 
“may be both durable and useful” (ibid.) and “may be of advantage to 
mankind.” (p. 162) Hume goes on to discuss two distinct sub-species of 
mitigated skepticism.  The second sub-species is what we would call 
empiricism, which leads to “the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as 
are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.” (Ibid.) This 
results in a negative outlook for “Divinity or Theology” and “[m]orals and 
criticism,” and in Hume’s famous rejection of metaphysics as “sophistry and 
illusion.” (p. 165) The first sub-species has more in common with what we 
would call skepticism.  Hume writes that: 
The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative 
and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects 
only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising 
argument, they throw themselves precipitously into the 
principle, to which they are inclined; nor have they any 
indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. […] 
But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the 
strange infirmities of human understanding … such a 
reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty 
and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, 
and their prejudice against their antagonists. […] [A] small 
tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing 
them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained 
over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the 
universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in 
human nature. (p. 161) 
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The “small tincture of Pyrrhonism,” that Hume here recommends, contrasts 
with the “excessive” Pyrrhonism that was dismissed as both useless and 
impossible to sustain.  Mitigated skepticism – which requires, or amounts to, 
an awareness of “the strange infirmities of human understanding” – prevents 
dogmatism, inspires modesty, and undermines prejudice against one’s 
interlocutors.  As David Fate Norton (2002) puts it, Hume recommends 
philosophical doubt, where “doubt” does not mean suspension of judgment 
(as on Cartesian skepticism), but rather a certain “cognitive activity or 
philosophical method.” (p. 384) We are to doubt our beliefs, that is “we are to 
attend to the counter-evidence and counter-arguments; we are to avoid 
precipitate decisions on the issues before us; we are to take note of the 
inherent limitations of our faculties.” (ibid.) All this, Hume suggests, can be 
both “durable and useful” – that is to say, it is humanly possible for people to 
doubt their beliefs in this way, and such doubt is valuable or beneficial.   
I’ll return to the idea that skepticism is valuable or beneficial, below (§4).  
What I would like to take away from Hume’s discussion, in the first instance, 
is the idea of skepticism as a character trait.  Both Cartesian skepticism and 
Pyrrhonian skepticism, as Hume understands them, are best understood as 
doxastic attitudes – either as (for example) the belief that knowledge is 
impossible or as (for example) suspension of judgment about all empirical 
propositions.  But what Hume calls mitigated skepticism is best understood as 
a character trait – in other words, as an integrated set of dispositions to act, 
think, and feel.  To be fair, Hume describes skepticism as flowing from an 
awareness of “the strange infirmities of human understanding.”  But, for our 
purposes here, we should take note of the fact that the skeptic is described in 
explicitly characterological terms.   
“Skepticism,” “skeptic,” and “skeptical” have characterological meanings in 
ordinary English.  So the Oxford English Dictionary gives one sense of 
“skepticism” as “[a] disposition to doubt or incredulity in general; 
mistrustfulness; sceptical temper,” with a “skeptic” thus “one who is 
habitually inclined rather to doubt than to believe any assertion or apparent 
fact that comes before him; a person of sceptical temper.”  This jibes with how 
Hume begins his essay on “The Sceptic” (1742): “I have long entertained a 
suspicion with regard to the decisions of philosophers upon all subjects, and 
found in myself a greater inclination to dispute than to assent to their 
conclusions.” (p. 95) This sense of “skeptic” is obviously related to the sense of 
“skeptic” relevant to what Hume calls mitigated skepticism.  But this sense 
also has connotations of suspension of judgment.3  These ordinary meanings 
of “skepticism,” “skeptic,” and “skeptical” are important, although quite 
different from their philosophical senses, especially in connection with the 
view that knowledge is impossible. 
                                                   
3 This sense of “skeptic” is related to its sense when it appears in the title of 
the magazine called The Skeptic, which takes “a sceptical look at 
pseudoscience and claims of the paranormal,” 
(http://www.skeptic.org.uk/about) and in the names of numerous societies of 
self-described skeptics, such as the Edinburgh Skeptics, who are devoted to 
“science, reason, and critical thinking in Edinburgh.” 
(http://www.edinburghskeptics.co.uk/about/) 
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2 Civic virtue as a species of virtue 
I assume that virtues are, roughly, character traits that are either admirable 
or desirable, by which I mean that to say that a character trait is a virtue is to 
express either an admiration for those who have said trait (in virtue of their 
having it) or a desire to have said trait.  
Perhaps virtues are more than mere character traits: perhaps the virtuous 
person must be responsible for having the virtues that she has; perhaps the 
virtuous person must be intelligent in manifestations of virtue.  These issues 
won’t matter for our purposes here. 
So much for the notion of a virtue; what then is a civic virtue?  The 
expression “civic virtue” is ambiguous.4  It could be used to refer to something 
that is both a virtue and (in a sense that would need to be articulated) civic; 
call this a predicative disambiguation of “civic virtue.”  Or it could be used 
to refer to something that is a virtue in some civic sense of “virtue” (that would 
need to be articulated); call this an attributive disambiguation of “civic 
virtue.”  The difference between these can be drawn out with a silly example.  
“Burglaic” means “of or concerning burglary.”  What then is a “burglaic 
virtue”?  On a predicative disambiguation of “burglaic virtue,” this refers to 
something that is both burglaic and a virtue – a disposition to steal from the 
rich and give to the poor, for example.  Or, on an attributive disambiguation of 
“burglaic virtue,” this refers to something that is a virtue in a burglaic sense of 
“virtue” – an ability to pick locks, for example.  A burglaic virtue, on the 
predicative disambiguation, is a virtue, simpliciter, that essentially belongs to 
the domain of burglary, while a burglaic virtue, on the attributive 
disambiguation, may or may not be a virtue, simpliciter, but is a “virtue 
relative to the aims of burglary.”  In this same way, a civic virtue, on a 
predicative disambiguation, is a virtue, simpliciter, that essentially belongs to 
the civic domain (which would need to be articulated), while a civic virtue, on 
an attributive disambiguation, may or may not be a virtue, simpliciter, but is a 
virtue in a civic sense of “virtue” (which would need to be articulated).   
Here we shall employ a predicative disambiguation of “civic virtue.”  This 
requires us to say what is means for a virtue to be “civic” – or, as suggested 
above, to say what it means for a virtue to essentially belong to the “civic 
domain.”  I’ll understand this as the domain of activity characteristic of 
citizenship – in liberal democratic societies, this comprises voting in free 
elections that are preceded by a period of campaigning and public debate, 
both formal and informal, as well as engaging with public policy is non-
electoral ways (protesting, communicating with elected representatives, 
serving on juries).  Essential aspects of the civic domain, in liberal democratic 
societies, and crucial for our purposes here, are both (i) the articulation and 
defense of your own opinions and arguments and (ii) critical engagement with 
the opinions and arguments of others.  So, on the present conception of civic 
virtue, any virtue that essentially impacts on these activities will count as a 
civic virtue. 
                                                   
4 Cf. Geach 1956.  
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3 Skepticism, intellectual humility, and intellectual criticism 
If you think x is a virtue (§2), and you want to define x, there are two 
approaches you can use.  On a description-first approach, you define x by 
describing a particular character trait, and must then argue that x is admirable 
or desirable.  Given your definition, <x> is a trait term, and your substantive 
task is to show that the trait picked out by <x> is admirable or desirable.  On a 
prescription-first approach, you define x in prescriptive terms, building 
the appeal of x into its definition, and must then provide a description of 
which trait x is.  Given your definition, <x> is a virtue term, and your 
substantive task is to say which trait is picked out by <x>.  An example will 
clarify what I mean here.  On a description-first approach to courage, you 
could define courage as a character trait consisting of a disposition to expose 
yourself to personal risk – we could call this the trait of courage – and your 
task would then be to argue that courage, so understood, is valuable.  By 
contrast, on a prescription-first approach to courage, you could define courage 
as excellence in exposing yourself to personal risk (cf. §2), and you task would 
then to be say something about the right time and the right way to expose 
yourself to personal risk.  Here I shall employ a prescription-first approach to 
skepticism.   
I’ll assume that the virtues are excellences in Φing, i.e. dispositions to Φ at 
the right time and in the right way.5  The expression <excellence in Φing> 
could alternatively be used to refer to the trait possessed by those who are 
good at Φing.  Consider “excellence in torturing,” which could be used to refer 
to a the trait possessed by those who torture at the right time and in the right 
way (i.e. those who rarely if ever torture, etc.), but also to refer to the trait 
possessed by those who are good at torturing (i.e. those who are particularly 
brutal and violent, etc.).  This examples shows that being good at Φing does 
not, in general, amount to a virtue. 
What does it mean to Φ at the right time and in the right way?  Although 
you might be happy to treat the notions of “the right time” and “the right way” 
as primitives, it is natural to understand these notions in teleological terms, 
such that the value of the virtues is derivative on the value of some aim.  
(Examples: you might think the virtues are appealing because they tend to 
cause something good; you might think the virtues are appealing because they 
constitute something good; or you might think that the virtues are appealing 
because they are constituted by the love of something good.)  What is the aim 
of the virtues?  You might treat the aim of the virtues as the happiness or 
eudaimonia of the possessor (and conclude, for example, that the virtues must 
benefit their possessor); or you might treat the aim of the virtues as the 
happiness  or eudaimonia of people in general (and conclude, for example, 
that virtues must be either pleasing or useful).  Here I shall treat the aim of 
the virtues as what is good, all things considered – which (we may assume) 
includes the happiness or eudaimonia of the possessor, as well as that of 
people in general, among other valuable things.  
                                                   
5 Individual virtues can thus be associated with characteristic activities – for 
each virtue, there is some Φ such that said virtue is excellence in Φing.   
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Here, then, is the definition of skepticism that I have in mind: 
Skepticism is excellence in attributing ignorance (e.g. saying 
or thinking that someone does not know that p), withholding 
attributing knowledge (e.g. suspending judgment about whether 
someone knows that p; or expressing such suspension), and 
questioning whether people know (e.g. asking whether or how 
they know that p).   
“Ignorance” here just means the lack of knowledge (it can mean something 
narrower in ordinary English), and “questioning whether people know” 
should be understood broadly, so as to include requests for evidence and 
challenges to the validity of arguments.  For short, let’s use being skeptical 
to refer to attributing ignorance, withholding attributing knowledge, and 
questioning whether people know.  Being skeptical, as suggested, includes 
both instances of private thought (e.g. thinking that you do not know) and 
instances of public expression (e.g. asking someone how she knows).  In any 
event, skepticism is, for short, excellence in being skeptical.6   
I shall treat intellectual humility as a part or aspect of skepticism: 
Intellectual humility is excellence in attributing ignorance 
to yourself, withholding attributing knowledge to yourself, and 
questioning whether you know. 
And we can likewise isolate that part of aspect of skepticism having to do with 
other people: 
Intellectual criticism is excellence in attributing ignorance 
to other people, withholding attributing knowledge to other 
people, and questioning whether other people know.   
Given our understanding of the notion of a virtue (§2), intellectual humility 
and intellectual criticism, so understood, are virtues.  Being intellectually 
humble is a matter of being skeptical with respect to yourself, while being 
intellectually critical is a matter of being skeptical with respect to other 
people.7  
You might understand “intellectual humility” so that intellectual humility has 
important connections to deference.  On such an understanding, it is 
important to acknowledge our own fallibility, so that we can appreciate our 
inferiority relative to other, more reliable, thinkers.  However, intellectual 
humility, when understood as a part or aspect of skepticism, is not plausibly 
connected in any notable way with deference – it is not more connected to 
deference than to non-deference.  For the skeptical person, and therefore the 
                                                   
6 Cf. Le Morvan 2011, §VI. 
7 These two “parts” are not wholly distinct.  Consider the difference between 
an attribution of ignorance on the part of someone who generally takes herself 
to know and an attribution of ignorance on the part of someone who generally 
takes herself to be ignorant.   
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intellectually humble person, will be just as ready to attribute ignorance to 
other people as to herself (cf. §4.3, §5.5).  
My definitions of skepticism, intellectual humility, and intellectual criticism 
focus on knowledge, at the expense of other epistemic statuses.  Some 
accounts of intellectual humility suggest a broader focus.8  You might think 
that intellectual humility is manifested, for example, by acknowledgement of 
your intellectual vices.  However, nothing will hinge on the narrow focus on 
knowledge – what I have to say about skepticism would apply even given a 
broader conception (although more would also need to be said).   
Given these definitions, skepticism – including intellectual humility and 
intellectual criticism – is a civic virtue.  Something is a civic virtue if it is both 
a virtue and civic (§2).  That skepticism is a virtue is a trivial consequence of 
its definition here.  So is skepticism civic?  Recall that (i) the articulation and 
defense of your own opinions and arguments and (ii) critical engagement with 
the opinions and arguments of others are both essential elements of the civic 
domain (§2).  Your dispositions to attribute ignorance, to withhold attributing 
knowledge, and to question whether people know will obviously have a big 
impact on these activities – and so we should count skepticism as a civic virtue. 
4 When is it good to be skeptical? 
Having employed a prescription-first approach to defining skepticism (§3), we 
must now say something about the right time and the right way to be skeptical.  
I shall approach this question by discussing the benefits and costs of being 
skeptical.  A more comprehensive survey of these benefits and costs is beyond 
the scope of this paper, so our discussion will necessarily be narrow.  I’ll 
articulate three benefits of being skeptical (§§4.1 – 4.3), enumerate some of 
the costs of being skeptical (§4.4), and conclude by returning to our question 
about the right time and the right way to be skeptical (§4.5).   
4.1 Being skeptical and inquiry 
It is sometimes said that knowledge is the aim of inquiry.  On one illuminating 
formulation of this idea, an essential function of knowledge attributions is to 
signal the end of inquiry.9  It’s important to get clear on the truth in this idea, 
as there are some falsehoods in the neighborhood.  It’s not the case that 
someone who attributes knowledge to herself always (so long as she is 
reasonable) ceases to inquire: someone might be aware that she knows that p, 
and nevertheless inquire about whether q.  Moreover, knowledge can be a 
precondition for inquiry (e.g. you can’t coherently inquire about the properties 
of the Higgs boson unless you know a lot of physics already), a means to the 
end of conducting inquiry (e.g. your knowledge of how microscopes work 
allows you to study cell anatomy), and a cause of curiosity (e.g. knowing that 
Brazil won two of the last five football World Cups makes you wonder how 
many they have won in total).  Finally, recognized knowledge that p does not 
preclude reasonable inquiry about why p – indeed, such knowledge seems like 
                                                   
8 Cf. Hazlett 2013.   
9 See Kelp 2011, Rysiew 2012.   
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both a precondition for such inquiry, as well as one of its common causes (e.g. 
knowledge that fire is hot makes you wonder why fire is hot). 
The truth to the idea that knowledge is the aim of inquiry is (at least) that 
someone who attributes knowledge that p to herself always (so long as she is 
reasonable) ceases to inquire about whether p.10  It is irrational to think that 
you know that p, and yet to continue inquiring about whether p.11 
The person who does not attribute knowledge that p, either to herself or to 
other people, will be able to reasonably inquire about whether p.  Consider 
someone who believes, but not does not take herself to know, that p.  Such a 
person will be able to critically scrutinize her own opinion, and in the course 
of this inquiry she may discover, and be able to articulate, reasons and 
arguments for her view.  As well, she will be able to critically scrutinize the 
opinions of those who disagree with her, and in the course of this inquiry she 
will discover, and be able to articulate, reasons and arguments for their views.  
The attribution of knowledge, either to yourself or to other people, stands in 
the way of being a critical interlocutor, i.e. one who will seek out reasons and 
arguments on both sides of a dispute.12 
By contrast, consider a familiar sort of intellectual stagnation, which 
manifests itself paradigmatically in political disagreement, and which plagues 
liberal democracies.  Someone makes a controversial political claim; her 
opponents dispute the claim – and that is where the conversation ends.  
Further inquiry does not occur; the two parties do not critically scrutinize 
their positions, either individually or as a group; reasons and arguments 
remain unarticulated.  Intellectual stagnation of this kind of bad for liberal 
democracies, which thrive on the articulation of reasons and arguments for a 
diverse set of positions.  I propose to diagnose a source of such intellectual 
                                                   
10 “At least” this?  That knowledge is the aim of inquiry requires more, e.g. that 
only knowledge (that p) satisfies or fulfills the internal or constitutive aim of 
inquiry (about whether p). 
11 This is true only given a somewhat artificial sense of “inquiry.”  You can 
know that p and reasonably seek evidence and arguments relevant to whether 
p – think of a detective who has conclusive but inadmissible evidence about 
the guilt of a suspect and who is thus tasked with finding admissible evidence 
relevant to whether said suspect is guilty, or a widget inspector who must as a 
matter of procedure formally inspect every 100th widget off the line for flaws, 
even if she knows that said widget is not flawed.  In the present sense, the 
detective and the widget inspector are not inquiring, strictly speaking, when 
they engage in their respective searches for evidence.  Similarly, someone who 
takes herself to know that p, but who seeks additional evidence that p so as to 
acquire justified certainty that p, is not inquiring about whether p, in the 
present sense.  (We might say that she is inquiring about whether it is certain 
that p.) 
12 The view that knowledge is the aim of inquiry stands in tension with some 
articulations of fallibilism, in as much as these suggest the coherence of 
knowing that p while continuing to inquire about whether p.  However, not all 
articulations of fallibilism suggest this, e.g. the view that it is possible to know 
on the basis of evidence that doesn’t entail the truth of the proposition known.  
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stagnation by appeal to the stultifying effects on inquiry of the self-attribution 
of knowledge.  In the case of stagnant disagreement, just described, the first 
party takes herself to know, and the second party takes herself to know, and as 
a result both take inquiry to be completed.   
Such intellectual stagnation is bad for liberal democratic societies.  My 
contention here is that the attribution of knowledge is a source of intellectual 
stagnation, in virtue of the fact that knowledge is the aim of inquiry.  Being 
skeptical – attributing ignorance, withholding attributions of knowledge, and 
questioning whether people know – is therefore valuable in as much as it can 
function as an antidote to intellectual stagnation.  
4.2 Being skeptical and disagreement 
Being skeptical has additional implications when it comes to disagreement.  
Attributing knowledge to yourself precludes reasonably attributing knowledge 
to disagreeing interlocutors – you can’t coherently think that you know that p 
and that someone else knows that ~p.  Thus, attributing knowledge to yourself 
ensures that you perceive a favorable disparity between yourself and 
disagreeing interlocutors.  This kind of disparity enables us to dismiss our 
interlocutors opinions and arguments, and often grounds a familiar sort of 
political entrenchment, in which disputants, taking themselves to know, 
dismiss each other as unreasonable – as Wittgenstein (1969) describes such 
situations in, “each man declares the other a fool and a heretic.” (§611) 
Avoiding this kind of entrenchment is valuable in liberal democratic societies.  
Being skeptical – and in particular not attributing knowledge to yourself – is 
therefore valuable in as much as it can prevent political entrenchment.  When 
disputants take themselves to know, entrenchment may ensue, whereas when 
disputants take themselves to be ignorant, or suspend judgment about 
whether they know, respectful engagement may be possible. 
However, attributing knowledge to others also ensures the appearance of 
disparity between yourself and disagreeing interlocutors: one that mandates 
capitulation in favor of the other party’s position.  When a would-be disputant 
takes her interlocutors to possess knowledge, she ought adopt their view.  In 
this way, attributing knowledge to others can result in deference, which also 
precludes continued discussion and dialogue (cf. §4.3).   
Finally, being skeptical is conducive to compromise.  If you take yourself to 
know that your position is right, and your interlocutor takes herself to know 
that her position is right, there is little hope that you will be able to achieve 
unanimity in your thinking about the present issue, for example, by 
articulating a third position that incorporates insights of both your and your 
interlocutor’s original views.  The possibility of such compromise is valuable 
in liberal democratic societies, in as much as it provides a resolution of 
practical conflict, and being skeptical is valuable in as much as it is conducive 
to such compromise.   
4.3 Being skeptical and the space of public reasons 
Finally, being skeptical can serve the important function, in liberal democratic 
societies, of challenging other people’s assertions.  The attribution of 
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knowledge to other people can amount to deference, and deference about 
controversial matters, especially moral or political matters, has traditionally 
been viewed by political liberals as problematic. 13   
One worry about deference in politics is that unchallenged false assertions can 
become familiar rumors, before ossifying into common knowledge.  Another, 
which I want to highlight here, is that the existence of a space of public 
reasons, as opposed to a traditional body of doctrine, depends on political 
assertions being regularly and systematically challenged.  Among the 
dialectical aspects of being skeptical are such challenges, in the form of 
linguistic attributions of ignorance (e.g. “You don’t know that”), linguistic 
withholding of knowledge attribution (e.g. “It’s unclear whether you know 
that”), and linguistic questioning about whether people know (e.g. “How do 
you know?”).  Unchallenged assertions, whether true or false, cannot give rise 
to opinions that are grounded in public reasons.  Liberal democratic 
intellectual life thrives only when ignorance is assumed and common 
knowledge must be earned through critical and open debate.  Being skeptical 
is therefore valuable in as much as it is essential for sustaining the existence of 
a space of public reasons.   
4.4 The costs of being skeptical 
I’ve described three ways in which being skeptical can be valuable in liberal 
democratic societies (§4.1 – 4.3).  Here I’ll briefly describe four costs of being 
skeptical.   
First, being skeptical can simply be dangerous.  Those who speak truth to 
power often suffer for it; those who challenge the assertions of the powerful 
sometimes meet the same fate.  Less drastically, intellectual humility is often 
less profitable than dogmatism.  Someone who claims to know how to cure 
cancer may be able to sell more medicine than someone who claims merely to 
have a reasonable belief about how to cure cancer.  And in academic life, 
confidence and bluster have the advantage over caution and understatement. 
Second, being skeptical can be bad vis-à-vis the acquisition of knowledge.  
Suppose a reliable authority says that p.  Challenging her, so that she must 
articulate reasons and arguments in defense of the proposition that p, might 
be good for the purposes of public reason, but you might have had knowledge 
that p from the outset, if you had just deferred to her authority. 
Third, being skeptical can harm members of marginalized groups, in 
particular when their claims to knowledge have been systematically ignored.  
The ideal of public reason requires the articulation of reasons and arguments, 
but members of marginalized groups can occupy a standpoint from which 
certain truths can be appreciated, even if reasons and arguments in their 
defense cannot be articulated.  It might be empowering for someone in such a 
position to attribute knowledge to herself, and equally important for others to 
attribute knowledge to her. 
                                                   
13 See especially Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?”; cf. Hills 2009, Howell 
2014.   
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Fourth, being skeptical can give succor to conspiracy theorists, such as those 
who profess to doubt or deny that climate change is caused by humans.  
Consider the proposition that recent increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide 
are responsible for recent increases in the severity of hurricanes.  Some 
scientists and many journalists are inclined to assert this proposition, even 
though it is scientifically controversial, such that a convincing argument in its 
defense has not yet been articulated.  However, challenging this assertion – 
demanding that better arguments for it be produced; critically evaluating 
arguments offered for it – will aid and abet those who doubt or deny that 
climate change is caused by humans. 
4.5   When to be skeptical 
Recall the assumption that virtues are excellences (§2).  The skeptic is not 
someone who attributes ignorance, withholds attributing knowledge, and 
questions whether people know, no matter what – she is someone who does 
these things at the right time and in the right way.  Given our understanding 
of the right time and the right way (§2), the skeptic is someone who is 
sensitive to the good, all things considered, in her dispositions to be skeptical.  
She is someone who is disposed to be skeptical when it is good, all things 
considered (and in a way that is good, all things considered).  You might then 
wonder: when, exactly, is it good, all things considered, to be skeptical?     
Given that a plurality of values are relevant to this question – a few of which 
I’ve been able to mention here (§§4.1 – 4.4) – it is unlikely that we can say 
anything simple and decisive in answer to this question.  To posit necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the all-things-considered goodness of being 
skeptical would provide us with an appealing principle to which we might 
appeal in practical reasoning.  But the complexity of the evaluative landscape 
makes problematic the formulation of such a principle.  We can, however, 
make a few generalizations on the basis of our discussion so far.  First, it is 
generally good to be skeptical when it is good for public discourse – when it 
can prevent intellectual stagnation, for example, or when it can prompt the 
articulation of public reasons.  Second, it is generally bad to be skeptical when 
doing so threatens to silence members of marginalized groups.  Third, it is 
generally bad to be skeptical when doing so leads to the flourishing of 
conspiracy theories.  Finally, it is generally bad to be skeptical when it will cost 
you a great deal.  In any particular case, however, the wise person will take 
stock of the benefits and costs of being skeptical, and proceed accordingly.  
Imagine that the popular and powerful Dean of the Faculty, who will decide 
whether you receive a lucrative promotion, accuses certain critics of her 
crackpot research, which challenges the extent of the Nazi Holocaust, of 
homophobia.  Should you publicly challenge the Dean’s assertions?  
Answering this question would require a complex weighing of the benefits and 
costs of such a challenge.  Possessing the virtue of skepticism, in this case, 
would dispose you to publicly challenge the Dean if and only if it would be 
good, all things considered, to do so.   
5 Objections and replies 
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This section considers some objections to my defense of skepticism and 
intellectual humility as civic virtues.   
5.1 Knowledge as the norm of belief 
You might object that the self-attribution of ignorance (cf. §§4.1 – 4.2) 
rationally requires suspension of judgment, on the grounds that you ought not 
believe that p unless you know that p.  This, along with some natural 
assumptions, yields the conclusion that you ought to suspend judgment about 
whether p if you think that you do not know that p.  If this argument is sound, 
Hume’s useful mitigated skepticism collapses into excessive Pyrrhonian 
skepticism, and my account of the value of being skeptical (§§4.1 – 4.2) is 
problematic.  For that defense relied on a picture of liberal intellectual life on 
which citizens have opinions – opinions that they articulate and defend in a 
community of critical and respectful interlocutors. 
However, it is false that you ought to suspend judgment about whether p if 
you think that you do not know whether p.  The false premise in the present 
argument is the premise that you ought not believe that p unless you know 
that p.  This premise has little intuitive appeal, since it is easy to imagine cases 
in which someone permissibly believes that p but does not know that p.  
Substantial but inconclusive evidence might point towards some conclusion, 
for example, making it permissible to believe that conclusion, but since the 
evidence is inconclusive, such a belief would not amount to knowledge.  
Captain Jack Aubrey might have good reason to think that the French will 
attack at noon – they have always attacked a noon before; noon is the best 
time for them to attack; etc. – without knowing that they will attack at noon.14   
And this also provides a counterexample to the idea that you ought to suspend 
judgment about whether p if you think that you do not know whether p, since 
it is easy to imagine that Aubrey knows that he does not know that the French 
will attack at noon.15 
You might therefore defend the premise that you ought to believe that p only if 
you know that p by appeal to the supposed incoherence of saying or thinking 
something of the form <p, but I don’t know that p>.16  However, the evidence 
for this supposed incoherence is unclear.  Suppose Aubrey were to say, “The 
French will attack at noon, but since we do not know that they will attack at 
noon, we must remain vigilant until then.”  If this is not incoherent – and it 
does not seem obviously or even prima facie incoherent – then the present 
argument is unsound.  (Saying or thinking something of the form <p, but I 
don’t know that p> is sometimes described as a form of “Moore’s paradox.” 
G.E. Moore’s own treatment of such cases – which is relatively brief, by 
contrast with more substantial discussions of <p, but I don’t believe that p> – 
suggests that saying or thinking something of the form <p, but I don’t know 
                                                   
14 The case is from Weiner 2005.   
15 Note that the plausibility of this kind of case doesn’t depend on the fact that 
Aubrey’s belief concerns the future; we could just as well have told a story in 
which he believes that the French are not in the area or that the French did 
not take on munitions, etc.   
16 See Huemer 2011, Feldman 2005, Gibbons 2013, Chapter 8.    
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that p> is not always incoherent.  Moore argues that asserting that p at least 
sometimes implies that you know that p.17 But implications can sometimes be 
cancelled – which is what Aubrey does in the present example.18) 
All this suggests the possibility of reasonable belief that does not amount to 
knowledge.  Countenancing such a possibility is what makes Hume’s useful 
skepticism mitigated – by contrast with the more extreme view that 
reasonable belief is impossible.  In this connection, we can contrast the self-
attribution of reasonable belief and the self-attribution of knowledge (cf. §4.1 
– 4.2).  First, reasonable belief, unlike knowledge, does not rationally require 
the cessation of inquiry.  It is possible to reasonably believe something 
tentatively, without certainty, so that reasonable inquiry about the truth of 
said belief is still possible.  Second, it is coherent to attributive reasonable 
belief, but not knowledge, to your disagreeing interlocutors.19   Parties to a 
dispute can coherently attribute reasonable belief to each other, allowing for a 
kind of mutually recognized parity, which itself allows for a kind of mutual 
understanding, in which they are able to explain the reasonableness of each 
other’s positions.  Third, the self-attribution of reasonable belief, unlike the 
self-attribution of knowledge, is not counter-conducive to compromise.  
Consider cases of mutually recognized reasonable disagreement – the 
recognition of the reasonableness of an interlocutor’s position can, in some 
cases, provide you with a reason to seek out a compromise position that would 
be reasonable for both you and your interlocutor to accept.   
5.2 Knowledge as the norm of practical reasoning 
You might object that the self-attribution of ignorance (cf. §§4.1 – 4.2) would 
interfere with your ability to act rationally, on the grounds that you ought not 
use the premise that p in practical reasoning unless you know that p.20  This is 
a variant on an Ancient Stoic objection to Pyrrhonian skepticism, known as 
the “apraxia” objection, on which the skeptic’s suspension of judgment would 
make action impossible; the present objection alleges that the skeptic’s self-
attribution of ignorance would make rational action impossible.   
However, it is unclear whether the idea that skepticism is a virtue would be 
threatened by the idea that you ought not use the premise that p in practical 
reasoning unless you know that p.   
First, my arguments (§§4.1 – 4.2) are based on the idea that the skeptic will 
behave differently than the non-skeptic, when it comes to her dispositions to 
inquire and when it comes to her critical engagement with the opinions and 
                                                   
17 See “Moore’s Paradox” (1993, p. 211) and Commonplace Book VI.15 (1962, 
p. 277).  Moore says the same, mutatis mutandis, about <p, but I don’t believe 
that p> in “Moore’s Paradox” (1993, p. 211) and “Russell’s ‘Theory of 
Descriptions’” (1959, p. 175-6).  See also Austin 1946.    
18 Cf. Hazlett 2013, pp. 236-7 
19 A controversial assumption; see Goldman 2010, Hazlett 2014.   
20 See Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005, Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; cf. 
Williamson 1996.     
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arguments of her fellow citizens (cf. §6).  So, in general, I welcome the idea 
that skepticism has practical consequences.21      
Second, for all I’ve said, the skeptic will attribute ignorance to herself only of a 
relatively narrow set of propositions – e.g. those concerning controversial 
political issues – and, therefore, it is unclear whether it is a liability that she 
will be rationally required to act differently than the non-skeptic, given that 
the practical consequences of skepticism are limited.  
Third, and most importantly, it does not seem plausible that the self-
attribution of ignorance, even about controversial political issues, would 
interfere with a person’s ability to act rationally, at least with her ability to act 
rationally in the ways that we expect a citizen of liberal democracy to act.  
Consider: 
You must vote in a referendum. The issue is complex and there’s 
widespread disagreement about the right way to vote.  You’ve 
given the issue some thought, although not as much as you 
might have given it, and have come to the conclusion that voting 
No is the right thing to do.  You believe, but take yourself not to 
know, that voting No is the right thing to do.  You discuss this 
with friends, who ask you for your opinion.  “We ought to vote 
No,” you reply, and proceed to offer your arguments.  When the 
day of the referendum arrives, your belief has not changed, 
although you still think that you do not know that voting No is 
the right thing to do.  As you fill out your ballot paper you 
reason as follows: “Voting No is the right thing to do, therefore, 
I shall vote No,” and straightaway you tick the “No” box on the 
paper. 
You’ve done nothing irrational in this story.  It seems like a perfectly normal 
case of deciding how to vote, talking about your decision, and voting.  I’ll leave 
it open whether this is a counterexample to the idea that you ought not use the 
premise that p in practical reasoning unless you know that p, for perhaps, in 
the present case, you never (in some sense to be explained) use the premise 
that voting No is the right thing to do in your practical reasoning.22  However, 
I think we can generalize from this case: there is nothing irrational about 
expressing your opinions in the space of public reasons, even when you think 
your opinions do not amount to knowledge (or when you are unsure or 
ambivalent about whether they amount to knowledge). 
5.3 Knowledge, confidence, and decisiveness 
You might think that someone who knows (that p) will be more confident 
(that p) than someone who merely believes (that p).  This is untrue: the 
                                                   
21 Compare the shallow kind of skeptic imagined by Wittgenstein (1969), who 
“does everything that the normal person does, but accompanies it with doubts 
or with self-annoyance, etc.” (§339) 
22 Cf. Hawthorne and Stanley on beliefs about probabilities (2008, pp. 581-5) 
and Williamson on non-serious assertions (1996, p. 498n). 
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credulous nitwit (who does not have knowledge) is highly confident in her 
opinion; the cautious sage (who does have knowledge) is not.  But perhaps 
someone who takes herself to know (that p) will be more confident (that p) 
than someone who takes herself merely to reasonably believe (that p).  The 
relevant question, for our purposes here, is whether such confidence is 
valuable.  It’s characteristic of violent fanatics that they take themselves to 
know the truth about morality, or politics, or religion, or whatever issue 
motivates their cause.  The terrorist bomber never says: “I don’t know that 
blowing up the embassy is the right thing to do, but after careful consideration 
I think that it is.”  So the value of confidence is obscure.  Alternatively, you 
might think that someone who takes herself to know (that p) will be more 
decisive, in her actions, than someone who takes herself merely to reasonably 
believe (that p).  The case of the referendum (§5.2) shows that this is not so: 
your vote, based on reasonable belief, can be just as decisively cast as the vote 
of the person who takes herself to know the right way to vote.  Although your 
vote is based on what you take to be reasonable belief, rather than knowledge, 
there is no indecision, no wavering or nervousness.  (We can imagine a kind of 
neurotic who suffers from indecision whenever she does not know that she is 
doing the right thing – but many of us aren’t like that.)  And, as with 
confidence, the value of decisiveness is obscure.    
5.4 Skepticism and quietism 
Above (4.1), I argued that being skeptical can function as an antidote to 
intellectual stagnation, in virtue of the fact that a familiar species of 
intellectual stagnation can result when disagreeing interlocutors both 
attribute knowledge to themselves, making further discussion appear 
pointless.  You might object, however, that a different, and equally familiar, 
species of intellectual stagnation can result when disagreeing interlocutors 
attribute ignorance to themselves and to each other, in virtue of the fact that 
this, too, can make conversation appear pointless.  The attribution of 
widespread ignorance, for example, can lead to a kind of quietism – since no 
one knows anything, there is no point in further discussion. 
You might simply want to take this point as articulating a further cost of being 
skeptical (cf. §4.4), to which the skeptical person will be sensitive (§4.5).  
Discussion may require a background of common knowledge (i.e. beliefs that 
everyone knows that everyone takes to amount to knowledge); attributions of 
such common knowledge thus promote the goal of avoiding intellectual 
stagnation.  Discussion flourishes when we challenge each other, but also 
requires shared assumptions and starting points.   
However, we should also distinguish between merely thinking that ignorance 
is widespread, on the one hand, and thinking that knowledge is impossible, on 
the other.  It is one thing to merely think that we do not know whether p, and 
another to think that we cannot know whether p.  For the sake of argument 
(and, it seems to me, only for the sake of argument), we can concede that, if 
we cannot know whether p, then it is pointless to discuss whether p.  Being 
skeptical (§3), however, does not involve thinking that knowledge is 
impossible.  Even if ignorance about whether p is widespread, i.e. if we do not 
know whether p, it can still make sense to discuss whether p, so long as we 
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think something can be gained from such discussion.  And the same point 
applies, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to thinking that ignorance about 
some topic (rather than just about some specific proposition) is widespread.  
So long as we think something can be gained from discussion of that topic, 
such discussion need not be seen as pointless.  So skepticism, as understood 
here (§3), need not lead to quietism.   
5.5 Intellectual humility vs. intellectual criticism 
You might object that intellectual humility and intellectual criticism, which I 
said were two parts or aspects of skepticism (§3), are in some kind of 
problematic tension with one another.  For example, you might argue that 
someone who takes herself to be ignorant about some topic will be less likely 
to challenge other people’s assertions about that topic (cf. §4.3), than will the 
person who takes herself to be knowledgeable about that topic, or that 
someone who consistently challenges other people’s assertions about some 
topic will be less likely to take herself to be ignorant about that topic, than will 
the person who refrains from making such challenges.  Being skeptical with 
respect to yourself seems to imply not being skeptical with respect to other 
people, and being skeptical with respect to other people seems to imply not 
being skeptical with respect to yourself.  Intellectual humility seems to imply a 
lack of intellectual criticism, and intellectual criticism seems to imply a lack of 
intellectual humility.  
There are two reasons to think that there is no problematic tension here.  First, 
recall the assumption that intellectual humility and intellectual criticism are 
excellences (§3).  Let us agree, for example, that being skeptical with respect 
to yourself implies not being skeptical with respect to other people.  The 
intellectually humble and intellectually critical person will thus be forced to 
choose, in particular cases, whether to be skeptical with respect to herself or 
whether to be skeptical with respect to other people.   But given that 
intellectual humility and intellectual criticism are excellences, she will choose 
well.  Compare the virtue of justice, understood (roughly) as excellence in 
distributing goods.  The just person will often be forced to choose, in 
particular cases, whether to keep something for herself or whether to give it to 
someone else, but given that justice is an excellence, she will choose well.  
Thus, granting that there is some kind of tension between intellectual humility 
and intellectual criticism, this tension is not problematic. 
Second, there is no necessary conflict between being skeptical with respect to 
yourself and being skeptical with respect to other people.  For example, you 
can challenge other people’s assertions about some topic without taking 
yourself to be knowledgeable about that topic.  Colin Powell says that there 
was uranium in these tubes, and I know next to nothing about uranium-
storing tubes, but I very much doubt that Powell knows that there was 
uranium in these tubes, and I demand that he provide an explanation of how 
he knows that there was uranium in these tubes.  Recall (§4.3) that political 
action is compatible with the self-attribution of ignorance.  Those who speak 
from positions of perceived expertise would sometimes prefer that non-
experts remain silent – but this is merely a norm designed to serve the 
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interests of the powerful.  Being both intellectually humble and intellectually 
critical may in many cases be difficult, but it isn’t impossible.   
6 Educating for skepticism 
You might want to argue that, if x is a virtue, then we ought to educate for x, 
i.e. that schools ought to adopt administrative and pedagogical policies 
designed to promote students’ possession of x.  If so, given that skepticism – 
including intellectual humility and criticism – is a virtue (§3), we ought to 
educate for skepticism.   However, you might question the idea that we ought 
to educate for every virtue – for perhaps some virtues lie outside the proper 
scope of education.  You might think that piety is a virtue, for example, but 
think that the proper place for the inculcation of piety is at home or at church, 
rather than at school.  Skepticism, however, looks like a better candidate for a 
virtue that ought to be inculcated at school.  This is for (at least) two reasons.  
First, skepticism is a civic virtue (§3), and thus plausibly within the purview of 
a secular education system.  Second, skepticism is valuable vis-à-vis liberal 
democratic society (§§4.1 – 4.3), and thus liberal democratic societies have a 
compelling interest in promoting it. 
How might we go about educating for skepticism?  What administrative or 
pedagogical policies might we adopt with the aim of inculcating skepticism – 
including intellectual humility and criticism?  Here I want to sketch an 
approach, in which students are encouraged to be skeptical as well as asked to 
identify situations in which being skeptical will be good, all things considered.   
Around the same time that Hume was singing the praises of mitigated 
skepticism in Edinburgh, Benjamin Franklin was inculcating a species of 
intellectual humility among his colleagues in Philadelphia.23  In his 
Autobiography, Franklin describes a debating society called the “Junto,” 
founded around 1727.  Given that all discussion was “to be conducted in the 
sincere Spirit of Enquiry after Truth … all Expressions of Positiveness in 
Opinion, or of direct Contradiction, were after some time made contraband & 
prohibited under very small pecuniary Penalties.” (p. 61)24 However, for 
Franklin, this principle has application beyond the confines of the Junto.  In 
his discussion of the virtue of humility, he writes: 
I … forbid myself … the Use of every Word or Expression in 
the Language that imported fix’d Opinion; such as certainty, 
undoubtedly, &c. and I adopted instead of them, I conceive, I 
apprehend, or I imagine a thing to be so and so, or it appears 
to be at present. (p. 94; see also p. 18)  
Claims to certainty and indubitableness – and, we may assume, claims to 
knowledge – should be replaced with humbler language, such as claims to 
belief or opinion. The point of all this is to further “the chief Ends of 
                                                   
23 Franklin and Hume would later become friendly correspondents.  They met 
in London in 1757, in Edinburgh in 1760, and in 1772 Franklin was a guest at 
Hume’s house in Edinburgh’s New Town. 
24 Page references to the Autobiography are from Franklin 2009.   
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Conversation,” namely, “to inform, or to be informed, to please or to 
persuade.” (p. 18) Humble language (“I believe,” “In my opinion,” etc.) is 
conducive to the flow of information between conversational participants, 
makes conversation more pleasant, and provides for the possibility of rational 
persuasion. Dogmatic language (“I know,” “It is certain,” etc.) results in 
entrenchment, unpleasant conflict and divisiveness, and dialectical standoffs.  
Franklin clearly took the employment of humble language to be possible, as 
part of the suite of practices that constitute the manifestation of humility.  
And he also clearly took such linguistic humility to be valuable or beneficial, 
going so far as to require such language for the manifestation of one of his 
thirteen virtues.25 
Being skeptical (§3) is conducive to courteous and respectful conversation.  
The skeptical citizen will articulate and defend her political opinions by saying, 
“In my opinion,” or “It seems to me,” or “I believe,” by contrast with “It is 
certain” or “We all know.”  (The latter are on the mild end of a continuum of 
familiar civic vulgarity.)  Linguistic self-attributions of knowledge are 
insulting to your disagreeing interlocutors, and imply that dialogue is 
precluded.  The person who says that she knows implies that her interlocutors 
are ignorant and that she has no interest in considering their position or their 
arguments for it.  These implications undermine the possibility of reasoned 
dialogue.  Skeptical language, by contrast, has the opposite implication: that 
dialogue is open, that interlocutors are respected, that arguments will be 
heard. 
For our present purposes, what is most interesting is Franklin’s policy of 
linguistic humility.  We can adopt a similar policy in the classroom, although 
perhaps for fear of bankrupting our children, we can replace Franklin’s system 
of penalties, for being dogmatic, with a system of rewards, for being skeptical.  
When a student is skeptical – when she admits that she does not know 
something, or when she challenges someone else’s assertion – she receives a 
reward – money, praise, candy, a gold star, whatever passes for currency in a 
particular classroom.  However, any system of this kind ought to be combined 
with a policy that requires reflection on the benefits and costs of being 
skeptical.  First, just as the person who uses a “swear jar” must eventually 
learn not to curse for the sake of not offending other people, rather than just 
to avoid paying the penalty, citizens in liberal democracies must eventually 
learn to be skeptical for the sake of liberal democratic society (among other 
things), rather than just for receiving the relevant rewards.  This matters on 
the assumption that being skeptical “in the right way” requires being sensitive 
to the values promoted by skepticism (cf. §4).  Consider someone who 
                                                   
25 Two caveats on the idea that Franklin defends intellectual humility as a 
virtue.  First, Franklin is best understood as defending the utility of pretended 
or performed humility, rather than humility proper.  His explicit proposals 
always concern linguistic professions of ignorance, rather than beliefs about 
oneself.  (Contrast this with Hume’s discussion of pride and vanity at Treatise 
III.iii.2.)  Second, for Franklin, the value of humility is prudential – he is 
concerned with the benefits of humble language for the person use uses it, 
rather than for her society or for people in general.  (Contrast this with 
Hume’s utilitarian account of virtue.) 
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employs Franklin’s humble language merely because she is afraid to be wrong, 
or to be proven wrong, or someone (like Franklin himself) who employs such 
language merely for the purposes of persuasion.  You might think that these 
people do not yet possess the virtue of skepticism (§3) – for that they must 
come to employ humble language for the right reasons.  Second, and more 
important, the proposed system was insensitive to the good, all things 
considered.  Someone possessing the virtue of skepticism will not attribute 
ignorance, for example, no matter what – she will do this at the right time and 
in the right way (cf. §4.5).  The proposed system suggests, and might 
internalize an appreciation for, the value of being skeptical.  Older students, 
however, will be in a position to balance this value against others.  Think again 
of the limited usefulness of the “swear jar” – once the bad habit of excessive 
cursing has been kicked, the virtuous person thinks about the value and costs 
of cursing, and (if all goes well) learns to curse at the right time and in the 
right way. 
The proposed system is based on an understanding of Franklin’s Junto rule, 
on which the purpose of the rule was not merely to reduce or eliminate 
dogmatic language at the Junto Club, but to serve as a constant reminder of 
the independent problems with dogmatic language – with small pecuniary 
penalties standing in as representatives of the independent pro tanto disvalue 
of speaking dogmatically.  Just as a “swear jar” is meant to make us think 
twice before cursing, the Junto rule is meant to make us think twice before 
attributing knowledge.  My proposed system, along similar lines, is meant to 
make students eager to take opportunities to speak humbly or critically.  
You might object that the proposed system would serve only to inculcate 
certain linguistic habits, leaving students free to attribute knowledge, to 
themselves or others, in thought.  This is of course a possibility.  But linguistic 
habits and habits of thought are causally connected.  Changing the way we 
speak can change the way we think; outer patterns of behavior often become 
inner patterns of thought.   This is why we ask our children say “I’m sorry” 
even when we know they don’t (yet) mean it; this is why ask them not use “gay” 
as a derogative adjective even though this (alone) will not make them any less 
homophobic.  The same, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to saying “In my 
opinion” and not saying “As we all know.” 
7 Is skepticism an intellectual virtue? 
Intellectual humility appears on some lists of intellectual virtues.26  Above, I 
treated intellectual humility as a part of aspect of skepticism (§3).  Is 
skepticism, as understood here, an intellectual virtue?  The expression 
“intellectual virtue” is ambiguous (cf. §2).  On a predicative disambiguation of 
“intellectual virtue,” this refers to something that is both a virtue and (in a 
sense that would need to be articulated) intellectual.  On an attributive 
disambiguation of “intellectual virtue,” this refers to something that is a virtue 
in some intellectual sense of “virtue” (that would need to be articulated).  Is 
skepticism an intellectual virtue, on either of these disambiguations?   
                                                   
26 See, for example, Zagzebski 1996, p. 114 and passim, Baehr 2011, p. 21.   
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On a predicative disambiguation of “intellectual virtue,” this depends on what 
we mean by saying that something (e.g. a virtue) is “intellectual.”  Suppose we 
were to say that a virtue is intellectual when it essentially belongs to the 
intellectual domain, where this comprises the (individual or collective) 
generation and sharing of information.  Belief-formation (the traditional 
epistemologist’s interest) is included here, but also the formation of other 
kinds of representation, the transfer of information between people (e.g. 
testimony), and the practices and institutions that regulate all these in a 
society.  It seems then that skepticism is an intellectual virtue, since your 
dispositions to attribute ignorance, to withhold attributing knowledge, and to 
question whether people know have clear and straightforward connections 
with the aforementioned activities.   
On an attributive disambiguation of “intellectual virtue,” it is unclear whether 
skepticism is an intellectual virtue.  Ernest Sosa (1991), employing an 
attributive disambiguation, offers the following definition of intellectual 
virtue: “a quality bound to help maximize one’s surplus of truth over error.” (p. 
225) Nothing I’ve said here suggests that skepticism would maximize your 
surplus of truth over error – although it may well do so.  However, consider 
the possibility of situations in which (for example) attributing ignorance to 
yourself will benefit your society (e.g. by promoting engagement with 
disagreeing interlocutors) at the expense of the project of maximizing your 
surplus of truth over error (e.g. because attributing knowledge to yourself 
would have enabled you to confidently acquire more).  It may well be that 
being skeptical at the right time and in the right way (i.e. when it is best, all 
things considered, to be skeptical) happens also to maximize your surplus of 
truth over error.  But this does not follow from anything I have said so far, and 
I think it would be a kind of happy coincidence if it turned out to be the case.   
8 Conclusion 
That there is this connection between skepticism and liberal democracy is not 
surprising, given the assumption that liberal democracy is distinguished from 
other social models by its superior treatment of difference – in short, by the 
way it handles disagreement.  In liberal democracies we expect, and celebrate, 
the existence of deep and fundamental differences between people: in their 
views, in their religious beliefs and practices, in their moralities and 
epistemologies, in their preferences and values, in their ways of life.  Political 
liberals – Mill and Rawls, among others, come to mind – have always 
emphasized the political importance of recognizing and respecting difference.  
Skeptics, for their part, have always emphasized the epistemological 
importance of difference.  Sextus Empiricus was inspired and fascinated by 
both cultural and individual differences27, and Hume made much of “the vast 
variety of inclinations and pursuits among our species, where each man seems 
fully satisfied with his own course of life, and would esteem it the greatest 
unhappiness to be confined to that of his neighbor.”28  The “liberal” part of 
                                                   
27 See Outlines of Scepticism, I 79-90, I 145-62, III 199-228.  
28 “The Skeptic,” p. 95.  Imagining that the reader will insist that “we come to 
a philosopher to be instructed, how we shall chose our ends,” (p. 97) Hume 
spends the rest of the essay offering a rather half-hearted and sarcastic 
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liberal democracy aims to secure each person’s satisfaction with her own 
course of life, and to ensure that no one is forced to adopt the life of her 
neighbor.  The “democracy” parts aims to deal with the resulting plurality of 
ways of life, by providing a means for peaceful coordination between a diverse 
group of people.  My account of skepticism is based on the idea that being 
skeptical is valuable in liberal democratic societies, where difference is an 
inevitable and essential element.29 
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